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Mobilization efforts by parties and candidates during election campaigns tend to reach 
those who are more likely to vote in the first place. This is thought to be particularly 
consequential for turnout among the young. Harder and less cost-effective to reach, young 
adults are less mobilized and vote less often, creating a vicious circle of demobilization. 
However, new forms of political communication — including online and text messaging —
have created expectations this circle might be broken. Is this happening? We examine data 
from Module 4 of the CSES surveys, looking at the prevalence of different types of party 
contacts in 38 countries, the profile of voters who are reached, and the effects of these 
efforts on turnout. New forms of party contacting do matter for turnout and partially reduce 
the age gap in contacting, but still fail to compensate for the much larger differentials that 
persist in traditional forms of contacting.  
 











Since Rosentstone and Hansen s pathbreaking account (1993), many have studied 
the effect of mobilization efforts on political engagement.  Some, although fewer, have 
examined conditions under which such contacts affect turnout decisions.  Even fewer have 
looked at different types of contact across countries, even though the technologies available 
for partisan mobilization have expanded dramatically in recent years.  Here, we seek to 
address this gap using a new and important source of survey data — Module 4 of the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems — that measures different modes of campaign 
contacting across 38 countries.
1
  
Explanations of turnout are diverse, including such key explanatory variables as 
resources (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), psychological involvement (Milbrath and 
Goel 1977), interpersonal networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), social attachments 
(Putnam 2001) — especially partisan attachments (Shaffer 1981) — and institutional factors 
interacting with all or some of the previous (Anduiza Perea 2002). Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993) focused on mobilization as a determinant of turnout, especially the efforts of political 
parties and candidates to stimulate voting.  We know that such contacts are skewed toward 
more active and involved voters and are thus likely to increase existing differences in 
participation (Gershentson 2003) notably exacerbating differences in participation between 
younger and older citizens (Karp et al. 2008; Stevens and Bishin 2011). The almost universal 
lower turnout rates among the young (Milbrath 1965; Blais 2000) has been explained by 
fewer resources (Glenn and Grimes 1968), weaker social attachments (due to geographical 
mobility, lower rates of marriage and weaker community and economic ties), and weaker 
political attachments, especially to party and ideology in particular (Strate et al. 1989; Achen 
and Sinnott 2007).  But the fact that parties are also less able or willing to mobilize the 
young seems add to a vicious cycle that disconnects the political world from young 
citizens  (Nickerson 2006: 48). 
In this article, we ask whether the development of new forms of party contacting has 
reduced this age gap. CSES s Module 4 includes measures of self-reported mobilization 
contacts by parties and candidates not only through such traditional means as face-to-face, 
mail, and leaflet contacting, but also through the use of newer mobilization tools, such as 
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texting, e-mailing, and social network messaging and posting. Online social media have 
often been described as a potential leveler in terms of motivating political participation  
(Holt et al. 2013: 19; see also Gil de Zuniga et al. 2014; and Shirky 2011), including a wide 
variety of types of political engagement (but see Boulianne 2015 for a more skeptical view). 
Party campaigns use of these mobilization tools have often been discussed, in particular, in 
light of their assumed greater potential to reach younger voters (Bosancianu 2014).  In at 
least some countries, they do seem to mobilize them more effectively (Aldrich et al. 2016). 
But how widespread are these positive effects? Do these new mobilization tools make 
young adults easier to reach across a wide variety of societies and political systems? What is 
their contribution to mitigate or even compensate for well-known age gaps in terms of 
mobilization, engagement, and turnout?  
 
Voter Mobilization: The Story So Far 
Election campaigns have become more professionalized and technologically 
sophisticated in their mobilization efforts as numerous international studies have attested 
to (Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2003). These changes 
have prompted increasing attention to what works and what does not in terms of turning 
out the vote. While most studies have focused on the case of U.S., the methods used have 
varied with some scholars using survey data and self-reported contact (Merriam and Gosnell 
1924; Cutright 1963; Kramer 1971; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Panagopoulos and Francia 
2009). Others have conducted field experiments, reviving the pioneering approach of 
Gosnell in the 1920s. (1927). Such work has taken off particularly since the late 1990s (see 
Green and Gerber 2016). These different studies have converged, at least, in one key 
finding: contacts involving live interaction with voters, especially through face-to-face 
canvassing, do matter for turnout, particularly when messages appeal to social norms (see 
Green, McGrath and Aronow 2013, Green and York 2017, and Nickerson and Arceneaux 
2009 for reviews). 
Cross-national surveys, such as those analyzed by Karp and Banducci (2007) and 
Magalhães (2016) suggest that being contacted prior to an election increases voting in many 
political systems. Field experiments by John and Brannan (2008) and Fieldhouse et al (2013) 
reinforced the importance of face-to-face contacting by extending the experimental settings 




However, this line of research has also suggested that party canvassing is not universally 
effective (Bhati et al. 2016), while more impersonal methods such as phone and direct mail 
may be more effective elsewhere than in the U.S. (Cutts et al. 2009). 
The growth in use of modes of digital contacting, especially after the extensive use 
made of online tools in the Obama presidential campaign in 2008, has reopened these 
questions. The evidence, so far, has been mixed.  Hooghe et al. (2010) reported null 
findings, Vaccari (2017) got positive findings, while still others (e.g., Aldrich et al., 2016) 
found heterogeneous results.  In terms of specific modes, email messages are seen as one of 
the least effective prompts (Stollwerk, 2006; Nickerson, 2007; Krueger 2010; Malhotra et al., 
2012), while text message reminders to vote appear to have only a somewhat stronger 
effect (Dale and Strauss, 2009; Malhotra et al., 2011). Findings about messages from social 
networks also range from small (Bond et al. 2012) to null effects (Brockman and Green 
2013; Aldrich et al. 2016).  
A few studies examined contacting as a dependent variable. First, not all countries 
are equal in this respect. Some countries report very high levels of contacting (over 50%), 
while others drop to nearly zero (Karp and Banducci, 2007). Authors point to a range of 
explanations. Newer democracies, with less well-organized, experienced and resource-rich 
campaigns, report fewer contacts (Birch 2005). Karp et al. (2008) also show that systems 
with single member districts (SMD) lead to higher rates of contact, as candidates are more 
likely to seek out a direct relationship with a voter than in more anonymous list systems. 
Furthermore, with lower turnout in plurality systems (Powell, 1986), mobilization has more 
potential to be effective. Systems where parties are more densely concentrated around the 
ideological center appear to lead to higher mobilization efforts than polarized systems 
(Karp, 2012).  
Karp et al (2008) also identify features of voters that make parties more or less likely 
to mobilize them. One main finding of this comparative work confirms what we already 
knew about the US: citizens who are already active and engaged are most likely to be the 
targeted. Not surprisingly, campaigns try to maximize the impact of their limited resources 
by directing their efforts toward those who are most likely to respond positively, i.e. those 
who have previously engaged with politics and who are easier to locate. The significance of 
other characteristics such as race, socio-economic status, and organized group membership 




Recent work by Panagopolous (2016) has taken this preaching to the converted  argument 
a step further by arguing that advances in micro-targeting mean that parties are now 
increasingly emphasizing base mobilization compared to riskier strategies that focus on 
persuading harder to persuade independent or undecided voters.  
There is also an age gap in contacting. In the United States, younger people are 
especially mobile and thus more difficult to reach. Parties seem to have internalized that in 
their judgment about the cost-effectiveness of resource allocation for mobilization 
(Nickerson 2006), and the age differential in the probability of being contacted seems to 
have increased through time (Gershentson 2003). Moving to new forms of campaign 
mobilization, things are less clear. Krueger (2006) finds in that, in the US, younger people 
are less likely to be contacted over the Internet. But it is not obvious that these findings will 
hold either cross-nationally or over time. In the low salience European Parliament elections, 
for example, Bosancianu (2014) finds that younger people are more likely than older voters 
to be contacted via the internet.  
 
Data and Results 
CSES data allows us, for the first time, to study different modes of contacting across 
many democracies. In Module 4 s fourth release, data from 38 countries were gathered 
through national election studies conducted from 2011 through 2016.
2
 That module 
includes a battery measuring different campaign contacts, several types of which can be 
broadly divided into traditional  and new . The former specifies if the contact was by 
mail, phone, or in-person. The latter includes e-mails, text messages, and social 
networks/micro-blogs such as found on Facebook or Twitter.  
 
 Cross national variation in levels of contacting  
We first present data comparing levels of the new and traditional forms of 
mobilization. Figure 1 shows the percentages of respondents in each country that report 
receiving contacts by parties or candidates during the electoral campaign in these different 
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 The use of mailing and leaflets remains, overall, the most common mode of 
contacting, followed by face-to-face and phone. Cross-national variations are dramatic, from 
countries like the UK or New Zealand (where close to 80% of voters are contacted by direct 
mail or leaflets) and Ireland or Mexico (where close to half of the electorate reports a face-
to-face contact) to countries such as Portugal or Bulgaria (where very few voters report a 
contact of any kind).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 shows a more direct comparison between being (1) contacted in any way, 
(2) through any traditional  mode (face-to-face, mail or phone), or (3) through any new  
mode of contacting (texting, e-mail or social networks).
4
 There is, first, very large variation 
in the rates of overall contacting. The UK has the highest level of citizens reporting being 
contacted in some way (close to 90% in the 2015 election). More than two-thirds of 
respondents in five other countries — New Zealand, (in both elections), Canada, 
Switzerland, Mexico (in 2015), and Australia – reported a partisan contact. At the other end 
are countries such as Romania, Slovenia, Poland, Portugal or Bulgaria where fewer than 10% 
of voters reported any type of contact.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Second, many more voters report being reached through traditional modes than 
through the newer modes of contacting (as already suggested in Aldrich et al. 2016 and 
Bosancianu 2014). In no country was as much as a third of the electorate reached by texting, 
e-mail, or social networks. Finally, Figure 2 already suggests that the new forms of party 
mobilization mostly seem to reach people who are also contacted in traditional ways. This is 
more clearly visible in Figure 3. The overwhelming majority of contacted respondents report 
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either traditional modes alone or both traditional and new forms of contact. With the 
partial exception of Taiwan, South Korea and South Africa, very few individuals are reached 
exclusively through new forms of mobilization. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Correlates of Party Contacting 
What drives party mobilization? One part of the answer pertains to the social and 
electoral context in which individuals are embedded. Greater levels of party contacting have 
been found in electoral systems with SMD and in older, more established democracies.  
Other studies point to the use of winner-take-all electoral rules and party system 
polarization. We know of no studies that have investigated whether these patterns carry 
over into the newer forms of mobilization. On the one hand, the relationship between single 
member districts and mobilization hinges partially on the ability to connect voters to a 
particular territorial location. While that connection is clear with the traditional modes, it is 
much more difficult for parties to be confident of territorial location with mobile phone or 
online contacting. On the other hand, the ability of parties to use these newer modes is 
likely contingent on the technological readiness of a nation. For example, while in highly 
economically developed countries such as Finland, the UK or Norway, over 90%, of the 
population has access to the internet, countries such as Kenya, Thailand and Mexico have 
50% penetration or less. Thus, we should expect, ceteris paribus, that these new forms of 
party contacting should be more prevalent in the more developed nations.  
In Table 1, we take a look at aggregate-level correlations between the prevalence of 
different types of contact and a series of country-level features, such as the use of winner 
take all/plurality rules,
5
 the use of SMD,
 6
 the age of the democracy,
7
 party system 
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 It s a dummy variable coded 1 for countries/elections where a winner-take-all / first past the post rule is 
employed. This includes presidential elections. See online appendix for sources of this and all other variables. 
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 and economic development,
9
 as well as the internet penetration rate and 
mobile phone subscriptions. The first set of variables has been linked to the prevalence of 
party contacting in existing broad cross-national studies (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp 
2012), while GDP, internet penetration and mobile phone subscription rates aim at 
capturing the extent to which the technological capabilities necessary for particular types of 
contacting are widespread.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 shows, first, that some of the correlates of contacting proposed in the 
literature are largely supported in this broad array of democracies. The use of single 
member districts and age of democracy (the latter employed as a proxy for the level of 
professionalization of parties in previous studies - Karp and Banducci 2007) appear to be 
particularly relevant in this regard. Results also reveal that, within the traditional modes of 
contact, mail and leaflet contacting is most related to these macro factors. In contrast, the 
prevalence of new modes of contacting seems appears to be weakly related to most of 
those factors. The only partial exception is GDP per capita, particularly for e-mail contacts.  
Turning to the individual level, the primary question here is whether the parties are 
targeting a different type of potential voter when they use the newer methods. 
Traditionally, parties tend to target — and to reach — individuals with more resources, and 
who have stronger social, partisan and/or ideological ties. A full examination of the role of 
all relevant individual level characteristics using the CSES dataset is not possible because not 
all election studies included all relevant measures.
10
 Given data availability and findings 
about the importance of the variables, we focus on five core micro-level factors – education, 
partisanship, marital status, gender, and age.
11
 As noted above, we pay special attention to 
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age. First, does the probability of being contacted by a party or candidate follow the well-
established curvilinear pattern exhibited by the probability of voting itself? Second, to what 
extent does this hold for the new modes of contacting?  
Table 2 shows the results of logistic regression analyses, where the dependent 
variable is simply whether a voter reports being contacted each particular way.
12
 We show 
the results of analyses for the six different binary dependent variables.
13
 Based on the 
exploratory results in Table 1, the macro-level variables employed include age of 
democracy, SMD, and GDP per capita for each country/year. In the results presented for 
texting and internet-related contacts, GDP per capita is replaced, respectively, by the 
number of mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants and by the internet penetration 
rate.
14
 Coefficients are standardized by dividing them by two times the sample s standard 
deviations.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The results confirm and provide further detail on the key findings from prior analysis 
of older CSES data (Karp et al 2008; Karp and Banducci 2007). Specifically they show that 
individuals living in countries with electoral systems employing SMD s are significantly more 
likely to be mobilized by parties through mail and phone. Similarly, the age of democracy 
and GDP per capita variables are significantly related to mail contact.  The relationships 
between the individual-level variables and traditional means of contacting support 
expectations from the literature. Respondents who are more educated, married, and who 
feel close to a party  are more likely to report being contacted. The age variable behaves 
very much as expected: the signs for age and age squared are both significant and suggest a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
party, it was not asked in all surveys. Marital status is coded 1 for all respondents who are married or living 
together with a partner. Female is coded 1 for female respondents. Age is years of age. 
12
 We estimated multilevel random intercept logistic regression analyses, correcting both for clustering and 
esti ati g a e age effe t  oeffi ie ts. We also o du ted ulti olli ea it  diag osti s fo  all eg essio  
analyses in this piece. Highest VIF — with obvious exception of the interacted age variable — was 2.15 (for 
Internet penetration rate, Table 2, model for e-mail contacts). 
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 For each analysis, we use all countries where the dependent variable is available in the survey, as well as the 
basic core of individual-level determinants described above and common to all surveys, to minimize loss of 
cases. 
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curvilinear relationship between one s age and the probability of being contacted.
15
  We ll 
examine this aspect in greater detail later. The signs, coefficient sizes and significance for all 
remaining individual-level variables are relatively similar, with the partial exception of face-
to-face contacts, where women are less likely to report being contacted in person than are 
men, while marital status and education seem to matter less than for other types of 
traditional contacts. 
In columns 3 to 5, we report the results for the new forms of contacting.  E-mail and 
social network contacting are more prevalent in nations with greater rates of internet 
penetration.
16
 However, neither the use of SMD s nor age of democracy make a difference 
in these types of contacts. The greater sensitivity of traditional contacting to institutional 
context and democratic longevity is intriguing and suggests that those modes are more 
strategically aligned with the incentives provided in the wider electoral environment. The 
newer forms, by contrast, appear to be more untethered and less structured by these 
broader systemic forces, and remain elusive, in terms of macro-correlates, in this analysis. 
We will return to this point in the final section. Partisans are more likely to be reached in 
these new ways than non-partisans, similarly to what happens with traditional modes. 
Finally, education plays an even stronger role for contacting using these new ways.  
 
A deeper dive into age and contacting. 
Figure 4 shows plots of the predicted probability of being contacted by parties or 
candidates at different ages based on the various models estimated in Table 2, i.e, after 
controls are introduced. For these plots, we reestimated the models using only the 32 
countries for which we have information about all of the types of contacts. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
                                                          
15
 Models were also run with age-cubed, on the possibility that contacting, especially the new forms might 
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In almost all modes of contact the relationship between age and being contacted is 
non-linear, as usual. The exception is being contacted through an online social network. 
Here we find a nearly linear, negative relationship, with young adults being more likely to 
report contacts compared with their middle-aged counterparts and even more so than the 
oldest respondents. However, on average, the probability of being reached in this way 
across our countries is modest. In all remaining modes, younger voters are less likely to be 
contacted than most other adults. This is especially so for contacts by mail or phone, and 
young adults are only marginally more likely to receive a text or e-mail than even the very 
oldest voters.  
Each individual can be exposed to multiple forms of contact. Table 3 reports analyses 
where we look at, respectively, the correlates of reporting any type of contact, a traditional 
contact, and one or more kinds of new  contact. Again, we focus exclusively on the 32 
countries on which we have responses for all kinds of contact. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The correlates of being contacted at all and of being contacted through traditional 
modes (columns 1 and 2) are almost identical, for the simple reason that almost everybody 
who is contacted in any way is contacted through a traditional mode. Again, use of SMD, 
level of education, and our indicators of social and partisan attachment emerge as relevant. 
With respect to those who report new forms of contacting, no coefficient for any macro-
level correlate is significant. There are three other major differences in comparison to 
traditional contacting. First, females are less likely to be reached. Second, marriage seems to 
make no difference. And finally, the relationship between the respondent s level of 
education the probability of being contacted is about twice as strong in comparison with 
what happens in traditional modes. 
Figure 5 shows findings with respect to age. While young adults are apparently less 
effectively reached by parties by traditional means than the other voters, such disadvantage 
mostly disappears when new forms of contacting are considered. Here, the oldest voters are 
least likely to be contacted. However, the lower prevalence of the new types of contacts 
overall, combined with the fact that young adults are not more likely to be reached in these 




considering all kinds of mobilization ( any contact ), young adults remain less targeted than 
any other type of voter. In other words, the new forms of party contacting have, so far, 
failed to compensate for the age gap in mobilization. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Of course, this is the most general picture. What happens on country-by-country 
basis? We estimated the individual level component of the multilevel logistic models used 
for Table 3 separately for each of the 20 countries in which we had complete data about 
traditional and new contacts, and where rates of prevalence of either was above a minimum 
threshold of 5 percent of the sample (in 12 countries, that prevalence was even lower). 
Then, we estimated the predicted probabilities of being contacted according to age for each 
country. Figures A1 to A4 in the online appendix show the results for four groups of 
countries. The first, the largest (12 countries/elections), replicates the general pattern: 
overall, younger people report fewer contacts than middle-aged adults (and in some cases, 
than all other adults), because they are less likely to be contacted in traditional ways, and 
new forms of contact fail to compensate for that differential. Then, in Sweden and Norway, 
exceptionally, younger voters are more likely to be contacted by parties in general, but this 
results from being more contacted both in traditional and in new ways. In a third group of 
countries/elections (Austria, Czech Republic, Mexico 2015 and Turkey), age and party 
contacting seem weakly related. Finally, in two cases, while younger adults were less likely 
to be contacted in traditional ways, they were more likely to be contacted in new ways. And 
as a result, the probability of being targeted by parties in any way ends up unrelated to age 
in Mexico in 2012 or with a differential in favor of younger voters in Finland. However, these 
are the only two cases where new forms of contacting make up the age gap due to 
traditional forms of contacting.
17
  
                                                          
17
 One possibility would be that these different patterns of age/contact relationships would be sensitive to the 
very distribution of the sampled population each country in terms of age. However, it is interesting to note 
that, in the country by country analyses presented in the online appendix, those countries with the most 
deviant age distribution of those surveyed in the CSES (Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, all characterized by 
more expansive  —broader at the base — pyramids of voting-age population) end up showing different 





In sum, with few exceptions, new forms of contact reach small segments of the 
electorate. They reach a similar profile of voters as traditional contacts, but one even more 
restricted to men and to the highly educated. Finally, although there is a tendency for 
younger adults to be less disadvantaged by these new forms of contact, this is not sufficient 
to overcome the broad age differential in traditional party contacting. 
 
Party contacting and turnout 
What difference does this make? Does being contacted increase the probability of 
voting? And if so, which mode(s) are effective? We have just seen how party contacts are 
not randomly assigned. Although this may be partially addressed by controlling for known 
covariates of turnout, both contacting and turnout can still be systematically related with 
attributes we were unable to measure (see Gerber et al. 2004). The consequence is that the 
use of observational data such as those collected in these surveys, compounded by the lack 
of relevant variables in several countries, increases the risk that any estimates of the 
relationship between contact and turnout will be biased, much more so than if experimental 
data were available.  
However, well-designed sample-surveys such as those in the CSES permit inferences 
to population values, something that experiments do not support, and it is nevertheless 
possible to employ strategies that may reduce — albeit never eliminate — the risk of bias. In 
Table 4, we show the results of three models of turnout, each employing a different 
independent variable: if the respondent reported being contacted by a party or candidate in 
any way; if the respondent reported being contacted just through a traditional mode; or if 
the respondent reported by contacted both in a traditional and a new way. First, we report 
the results from a multilevel random intercept logistic regression model, using a single 
macro-level ordinal variable (Compulsory voting),
18
 as well as from fixed-effects probit, 
where the cluster variables (countries/elections) enter the model as dummy variables, thus 
capturing all variability associated with the cluster level. However, we also estimate a fixed 
effects, recursive, bivariate probit model. Given that we know that people were not 
contacted by campaigns randomly, and were instead selected (and self-selected) in ways 
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that make being contacted at least partially endogenous, the recursive, bivariate probit 
procedure is designed to reflect that possibility, by estimating two equations 
simultaneously; one for the endogenous contact variable and the other for turnout.
19
 Table 
4 shows the results. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Consider first the relationship with turnout of the remaining explanatory variables 
besides contacting.  In the multilevel model, the compulsory voting measure is statistically 
significant and substantively large. Party closeness and education are powerful predictors of 
turnout in all models. However, their importance is rivaled by that of being contacted by a 
party in the third set of models, where contact  is cumulative, i.e., having reported being 
contacted both in a traditional and in a new way. In sum, institutions and the basic triad  of 
individual level variables that explain turnout – resources, attachments, and mobilization 
efforts – are once again found to be consequential. 
Figure 6 shows the marginal effects of the different contact variables on the 
probability of voting. Interpretation is straightforward. In both our multilevel logit and fixed 
effects probit models, the probability of turning out is estimated to be about 4 percentage 
points higher for those who were contacted in any way in comparison with those who were 
not contacted at all. But strikingly, those who reported being contacted both in traditional 
and in newer ways were much more likely (8 percentage points) to have voted than those 
not contacted at all.  
The bivariate probit estimations have much larger confidence intervals, as usual, and 
the coefficients for contacting are not significant for either the any contact  or traditional 
contact  variables. However, the estimated effects of the cumulative traditional + new 
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(1983) proposed standard exclusion restrictions on the first equation, Wilde (2000) showed that in models 
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contact variable are significant and even larger than in the other models.
20
 Furthermore, the 




Figure 6 about here 
 
Parties contacting citizens to stimulate mobilization appears to be positively and 
significantly related to turnout. The four percentage point estimated effect of being 
contacted by a party in traditional ways is similar to that obtained in other comparative 
studies (Karp and Banducci 2007; Magalhães et al. 2016). More importantly, the results 
indicate that new forms of contact may be consequential. Even though they have not 
greatly expanded the portion of the electorate that was already reached by traditional 
means, they seem to contribute to a cumulative effect, nearly doubling the propensity to 
vote beyond what being contacted just through traditional modes are able to achieve, a 
result that is robust to the estimation strategy employed. 
 
Discussion 
Partisan mobilization efforts are known to focus on particular profiles of voters – 
those who are already engaged and likely to respond. The arrival of digital communication 
channels has introduced a new and cost-effective way for parties to reach groups less 
usually contacted  – including younger voters – and thus hold the potential to break a 
vicious cycle of under-mobilization and disengagement. Our analysis, using self-reported 
contact data from 38 countries, has both positive and negative news in this regard. 
Whatever the potential for greater youth mobilization through new methods may be, it has 
yet to materialize to any substantial degree. While younger people are comparatively more 
likely to be contacted by parties using these newer methods, the overall frequency of such 
                                                          
20
 We ran similar models for those being contacted only via the new forms of contacting.  With many fewer 
receiving such contacts, standard errors are much larger than in the comparable models reported in Table 4 
and Figure 6.  In the logit and fixed-effects probit models, contacting is nonetheless statistically significant  
with a positive but somewhat smaller coefficient. The fixed effects bivariate probit model, however, has a 
(barely) significant but negative coefficient with a very large standard error.  The dramatically larger standard 
error suggests overfitting with virtual non-convergence, something that does not seem to apply to the 
measures as reported in Table 4 and Figure 6. Details available on request. 
21
 In Table 3, the rho statistics, which show the correlation of the disturbances between the two equations, are 
negative, small, and not significantly different from zero. Thus, while the negative sign suggests that the effect 
of contact may be underestimated in simple probit models, the fact that it is not statistically significant implies 




self-reported contact is very limited compared with other more traditional modes. The 
profile of those contacted is otherwise not particularly different from those contacted in 
more traditional ways. Indeed, as in the case for education, the socio-political selectivity 
driving the traditional types of contacting appears to be carried over and reinforced by new 
forms. 
These results are even more intriguing given our subsequent findings that the new 
forms of contact appear to be successful for mobilization. The interpretation of this, 
however, is not straightforward. Even though traditional methods of contact retain power 
for mobilizing voters, it is their combination with new modes that seems particularly 
consequential, virtually doubling the estimated impact of traditional contacts alone. This 
finding boosts the case for parties to adopt new methods into their arsenal of campaign 
mobilization weapons. However, given that, at least at this point in their development, the 
newer types of contact target mostly those who have already been contacted through more 
traditional means, the most likely outcome of an increasing use of digital methods for the 
foreseeable future would seem to lead to a greater mobilization of the already engaged.  
Several limitations of our study must be acknowledged. First, we relied on 
observational survey data. Although studies based on experimental data are not devoid of 
the risk of bias in the estimation of the effects of contact on turnout, that risk is much 
higher with observational data, in spite of the estimation techniques employed in this study. 
Second, we relied on the self-reports of respondents to measure contact. One might argue 
that, regardless of the potential slippage between actual exposure to partisan messages and 
voters  perception of that exposure, it is the latter that should matter to explain voters  
behavior. However, we also know that, particularly in what concerns some aspects of online 
behavior, self-reports and objective  measures tend to be discrepant (Revilla et al. 2017), 
and we can only speculate about the potential effects of such discrepancies between 
perception and reality for our results.  
Finally, our analysis of the macro-level determinants of contact, and particularly the 
null or weak findings for the new forms of contact, may reflect a missing variable  problem 
at the systemic level. On the one hand, internet penetration rates do not necessarily reflect 
the extent to which online tools are used for political purposes beyond party contacting in 
different countries, including political discussion, online petitions, chat room participation, 




individuals easier to target by parties during political campaigns. Unfortunately, we have no 
measures of such variables across the broad range of countries under examination in the 
surveys. On the other hand, our institutional variables fail to capture the new and 
increasingly broader set of protection and privacy rules that shape parties  micro-targeting 
efforts, particularly through digital messages. The emerging work on this field has pointed to 
a relationship between the wider regulatory environment and the incidence of data-driven 
campaigning  in a country (Anstead, 2017; Bennett, 2016). Particular attention has been 
given to the case of the U.S., a case where much of the privacy regulation that restricts 
parties and candidates elsewhere is side-stepped (Hersh, 2015; Bennett, 2016; Bimber, 
2014). Unfortunately, a comprehensive cross-national picture of these regulatory controls 
and data protection regimes operating at the national level across CSES countries also does 
not currently exist. However, there would clearly appear to be an increasingly compelling 
case for the development and application of such an index in comparative studies of voter 
mobilization. 
Future work departing from this study, besides addressing the preceding limitations, 
might well take two main directions. First, it is important to confirm and understand how 
and why the combined effect of traditional and new forms of contacting actually works. Do 
traditional forms of contacting receive a boost when followed by email, text message or 
tweets, or vice-versa? Or is the effect simply due to the sheer volume and diversity of 
contacts? Thus, an important next step for analyses that follow will be to measure the 
sequencing as well as the frequency of each type of contacting. Second, we have examined 
the impact of new and traditional forms of contacting on a singular form of participation, 
namely voting. It may be that social media and other new technologies are already 
effectively stimulating participation in other ways, such as mobilizing people to become 
campaign activists, to donate money, or to seek to persuade others to vote. Whether there 
are stronger or even different effects of these new methods of contact across political 
participation is clearly an important next question to address.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of respondents contacted by parties or candidates in traditional, new, 
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Table 1. Aggregate level correlations between prevalence of different types of party 
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Table 2. Correlates of party mobilization. Multilevel logistic regression standardized 
coefficients. 
  Traditional   New  
 Face to 
face 
Mail Phone Texting E-mail Social 
network 






























- - - 
Mobile phone subscriptions 
(per hundred) 
- - - .12 
(.48) 
- - 
Internet penetration rate - 
 






































































































































Table 3. Correlates of party mobilization. Multilevel logistic regression standardized 
coefficients.  
 Multilevel logistic 






























































































Table 4. Estimates of the effect of different types of contact: multilevel logistic, fixed-effects probit and fixed-effects bivariate probit. 
Standardized coefficients. 






















Dependent variable Turnout Turnout Turnout Contact Turnout Turnout Turnout Contact Turnout Turnout Turnout Contact 
Compulsory voting .98** 
(.30) 
- - - .98** 
(.31) 
- - - .98** 
(.32) 
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1. Variables and sources 
 
Variable Source 
Mail/leaflet contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_2 
Face to face contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_1 
Phone contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_3 
Text/SMS contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_4 
E-mail contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_5 
Social network contact CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3020_6 
Female CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D2002 
Age CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D2001_Y 
Education CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D2003 
Married CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D2004 
Close to party CSES 4 (April 2017 Release): Variable D3018_1 
Age of democracy (log) Polity IV dataset (Available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). 
Single member districts Cruz, Keeter, and Scartascini (2016). Available at: 
http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-
details,3169.html?pub_id=IDB-DB-121. 
GDP per capita 000s 
(log) 
GDP per capita PPP at constant 2011 international dollars, from the World 




Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2. 
Internet penetration 
rate 
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS.  
 





See Dalton (2011). Available at: 
http://www.cses.org/datacenter/usercommunity3/usercommunity3.htm.   
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2. Age and probability of being contacted by parties 
 
 
Figure A1. Age and probability of being contacted by parties in different ways in selected 
countries: new contacts do not compensate for age differential (blue: new contacts; red: 
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Figure A2. Age and probability of being contacted by parties in different ways in selected 
countries: relationship between age and all kinds of contacts tends to be negative (blue: 




Figure A3. Age and probability of being contacted by parties in different ways in selected 
countries: no relationship between contact and age (blue: new contacts; red: traditional 

















































Figure A4. Age and probability of being contacted by parties in different ways in selected 
countries: new contacts compensate for age differential in traditional contacts (blue: new 
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